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Existence of Saddle Points in Discrete Markov Games and Its
Application in Numerical Methods for Stochastic Differential Games
Q. S. Song and G. Yin
Abstract— This work establishes sufficient conditions for
existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. The result
reveals the relation between dynamic games and static games
using dynamic programming equations. This result enables us
to prove existence of saddle points of non-separable stochastic
differential games of regime-switching diffusions under appro-
priate conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The merge of differential games and regime-switching
models stems from a wide range of applications in com-
munication networks, complex systems, and financial engi-
neering. Many problems arising in, for example, pursuit-
evasion games, queueing systems in heavy traffic, risk-
sensitive control, and constrained optimization problems, can
be formulated as two-player stochastic differential games [1],
[2], [3]. In another direction, recent applications for better
describing the random environment leads to the use of the
so-called regime-switching models; see [8], [11], [14], [19],
[20] and many references therein. Since for many problems
arising in applications, closed-form solutions are difficult to
obtain. As a viable alternative, one is contended with numer-
ical approximations [10], [12], [15]. A systematic approach
of numerical approximation for stochastic differential games
was provided in [6] using Markov chain approximation
methods. The major difficulty in dealing with such game
problems is to prove the existence of the value of the game.
To ensure the existence of saddle points, separability with
respect to controls for objective function and the drift of the
diffusion is required in [6]. It would be nice to be able to
relax the separability condition.
Markov chain approximations of stochastic differential
games are indeed discrete Markov games. In this paper,
we aim to develop sufficient conditions for the existence
of saddle point of discrete Markov games. In the proof,
we start with dynamic programming equation together with
static game results obtained by Sion [13] and von Neumann
[9], discover the relations between static games and dynamic
games by a series of inequalities. This approach enables us
to treat non-separable discrete Markov games with respect
to controls. By virtue of results in discrete Markov games,
we can easily prove the existence of saddle points of dis-
crete Markov games arising in numerical approximations of
stochastic differential games when a discretization parameter
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h is used. As h→ 0, we are able to obtain the existence of
saddle points of non-separable stochastic differential games
using weak convergence techniques in [7] and [6].
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section II
begins with the formulation of the discrete Markov games.
Section III presents sufficient conditions for the existence of
saddle points of discrete Markov games for both ordinary
control and relaxed control spaces, respectively. Section IV
applies the results in the discrete Markov games to stochastic
differential games. Section V concludes the paper with
further remarks.
II. FORMULATION
Consider a two-player discrete Markov zero-sum game.
Let S be a finite state space of a Markov chain, and ∂S ⊂ S
be a collection of absorbing states. Control space U1 and
U2 for player 1 and player 2 are compact subsets of R.
[For notational simplicity, we have chosen to treat real-
valued controls in this paper.] Let {ξn, n < ∞} be a con-
trolled discrete-time Markov chain, whose time-independent
transition probabilities controlled by a pair of sequences
{(u1,n, u2,n), n <∞} is
p(x, y|r1, r2) = P{ξn+1 = y|ξn = x, u1,n = r1, u2,n = r2},
(1)
where ui,n ∈ Ui denote the decision at time n by player i.
Definition 2.1: A control policy {(u1,n, u2,n), n < ∞}
for the chain {ξn, n <∞} is admissible if
P{ξn+1 = y|ξk, u1,k, u2,k, k ≤ n} = p(ξn, y|u1,n, u2,n).
(2)
If there is a function ui(·) such that ui,n = u(ξi), then we
refer to ui(·) as a feedback control of player i.
Given the running cost function c(·, ·, ·) : S ×U1×U2 7→
R
+∪{0}, and the terminal cost function g(·) : S → R+∪{0},
the cost for an initial ξ0 = x ∈ S and an admissible control
policy (u1, u2) = {(u1,n, u2,n) : n <∞} is defined by
W (x, u1, u2) = E
u1,u2
x [
N−1∑
n=0
c(ξn, u1,n, u2,n)+g(ξN )], (3)
where N = min{n : ξn ∈ ∂S} and Eu1,u2x is the expectation
given that initial ξ0 = x and control (u1, u2).
In the discrete Markov game, player 1 wants to minimize
the cost, while player 2 wants to maximize. The two play-
ers have different information available depending on who
makes the decision first (or who “goes first”). Using Ui(1)
to denote the space of the admissible ordinary controls that
player i goes first. That is, for ui ∈ Ui(1), there exists a
sequence of measurable functions Fn(·) taking values in Ui
such that ui,n = Fn(ξk, k ≤ n;u1,k, u2,k, k < n). Similarly,
using Ui(2) to denote the collection of the admissible or-
dinary controls that player i goes last, that is, ui ∈ Ui(2)
is determined by a sequence of measurable functions F˜n(·)
taking values in Ui such that ui,n = F˜n(ξk, k ≤ n;ui,k, k <
n;uj,k, k ≤ n, j 6= i).
To proceed, we define upper and lower values by
V +(x) = min
u1∈U1(1)
max
u2∈U2(2)
W (x, u1, u2) (4)
V −(x) = max
u2∈U2(1)
min
u1∈U1(2)
W (x, u1, u2), (5)
respectively. It is obvious V −(x) ≤ V +(x) for ∀x ∈ S. If
the lower value and upper value are equal, then we say there
exists a saddle point for the game, and its value is
V (x) = V +(x) = V −(x), ∀x ∈ S. (6)
The corresponding dynamic programming equation is
V +(x) = min
r1∈U1
max
r2∈U2
{Ex[V
+(ξ1)] + c(x, r1, r2)}, (7)
V −(x) = max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{Ex[V
−(ξ1)] + c(x, r1, r2)}. (8)
Practically, we can find V + and V − in (4) and (5) by solving
(7) and (8) using iterations. This is possible owing to the
following lemma. The proof of this lemma can be found in
[4, Lemma 2], and a weaker form in [18].
Lemma 2.2: {ξn, n < ∞} is Markov chain with state
space S, absorbing states ∂S, and transition probability
p(x, y|r1, r2). Let there be a real number γ > 0 with
P (ξn ∈ ∂S|ξ0 = x, u1,k, u2,k, k ≤ n) ≥ γ, ∀x ∈ S, (9)
c(x, r1, r2) is continuous in r1 and r2, To each admissible
control, (u1, u2), the cost W (x, u1, u2) is defined by (3).
Then W (x, u1, u2) is finite and solutions of (7) and (8) are
unique. For any initial value {V +0 (x) : x ∈ S}, the sequence
V +n+1(x) = min
r1∈U1
max
r2∈U2
{Ex[V
+
n (ξ1)] + c(x, r1, r2)} (10)
converges to V +(x), the unique solution of (7) as n → ∞.
Analogously, for any initial {V −0 (x), x ∈ S}, the sequence
V −n+1(x) = max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{Ex[V
−
n (ξ1)] + c(x, r1, r2)} (11)
converges to V −(x), the unique solution of (8) as n→∞.
III. EXISTENCE OF SADDLE POINTS
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of saddle points in discrete Markov games. An
existence proof is established through a series of inequalities.
In addition, the definition of relaxed controls is given as a
generalization of ordinary controls. It is shown that saddle
points always exist in relaxed control space.
Definition 3.1: f(r1, r2) is said to be convex-concave
with respect to (r1, r2), if f(·, r2) is convex and f(r1, ·)
is concave.
Next, we present a well-known minimax principle in static
games, which was obtained by Sion in [13].
Lemma 3.2: Let M1 and M2 be compact spaces, φ(·, ·)
be a convex-concave function on M1 ×M2, then
min
r1∈M1
max
r2∈M2
φ(r1, r2) = max
r2∈M2
min
r1∈M1
φ(r1, r2).
One of following two assumptions are needed for the
existence theorem.
(H1) p(x, y|r1, r2) and c(x, r1, r2) are continuous and
separable in r1 and r2.
(H2) p(x, y|r1, r2) and c(x, r1, r2) are convex-concave
with respect to (r1, r2).
Theorem 3.3: Assume either (H1) or (H2). {ξn, n < ∞}
is a Markov chain as in Lemma 2.2. Let V +(x) and V −(x)
be associated upper and lower values defined in (4) and (5).
Then there exists a saddle points, that is,
V +(x) = V −(x), ∀x ∈ S.
Proof. Define two functions φ+(·) and φ−(·) by
φ+(x, r1, r2) =
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|r1, r2)V
+(y) + c(x, r1, r2),
φ−(x, r1, r2) =
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|r1, r2)V
−(y) + c(x, r1, r2).
The dynamic programming equation of (7) and (8) can be
rewritten as
V +(x) = min
r1∈U1
max
r2∈U2
{φ+(x, r1, r2)},
V −(x) = max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{φ−(x, r1, r2)}.
Under either assumption (H1) or (H2), by Lemma 3.2,
min
r1∈U1
max
r2∈U2
φ+(x, r1, r2) = max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
φ+(x, r1, r2).
(12)
Let ρ = maxx∈S{V +(x)− V −(x)} ≥ 0, then
V +(x) ≤ V −(x) + ρ, ∀x ∈ S. (13)
In particular, there exists xˆ ∈ S, so that equal holds in (13),
V +(xˆ) = V −(xˆ) + ρ. (14)
For xˆ given in (14), a series of inequalities follows,
V +(xˆ) = min
r1∈U1
max
r2∈U2
{φ+(x, r1, r2)}
= max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{φ+(x, r1, r2)}
= max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|r1, r2)V
+(y)
+c(x, r1, r2)}
≤ max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|r1, r2)(V
−(y) + ρ)
+c(x, r1, r2)}
= max
r2∈U2
min
r1∈U1
{φ−(x, r1, r2)}+ ρ
= V −(xˆ) + ρ.
(15)
By virtue of (14), we conclude all inequalities are indeed
equal in (15), and this implies
V +(y) = V −(y) + ρ, ∀y ∈ S.
Note that V +(x) = V −(x) for all x ∈ ∂S. Hence ρ = 0.
The existence of the saddle point is established. 
The above theorem gives sufficient conditions for the
existence of saddle points. We note that there always exist
saddle points in relaxed control space with merely continuity
assumed.
Definition 3.4: A control policy {(m1,n,m2,n), n < ∞}
for the chain {ξn, n < ∞} is said to be a relaxed control
policy, if mi,n is a probability measure on B(Ui), a σ-algebra
of Borel subsets of Ui.
More general definition of relaxed control is given by
Definition 4.1 in the context of stochastic differential games.
Let P(U1) and P(U2) be collection of probability measure
on B(U1) and B(U2). Slightly abusing notations, we gener-
alize real function f(·, ·) on U1 × U2 into a function f on
P(U1)× P(U2) as following
f(µ1, µ2) =
∫
U1
∫
U2
f(r1, r2)µ1(dr1)µ2(dr2).
Using the notation of relaxed control representation, the
transition probability function is
p(x, y|µ1, µ2) =
∫
U1
∫
U2
p(x, y|r1, r2)µ1(dr1)µ2(dr2),
and the cost under the relaxed control policy (m1,m2) =
{(m1,n,m2,n), n <∞} is
W (x,m1,m2) = E
m1,m2
x [
N−1∑
n=0
c(ξn,m1,n,m2,n) + g(ξN )].
Using Γi(1) to denote the space of admissible relaxed
controls that player i goes first. That is, for mi ∈ Γi(1),
there exists a sequence of measurable function Hn(·) taking
values in P(Ui) such that
mi,n = Hn(ξk, k ≤ n,m1,k,m2,k, k < n).
Analogously, using Γi(2) to denote the space of admissible
relaxed controls that player i goes last. That is, mi ∈ Γi(2),
there exists a sequence of measurable function H˜n(·) taking
values in P(Ui) such that
mi,n = H˜n(ξk, k ≤ n;m1,k, k < n;mj,k, k ≤ n, j 6= i).
The upper and lower values associated with relaxed control
space are defined by
V +m (x) = min
m1∈Γ1(1)
max
m2∈Γ2(2)
W (x,m1,m2) (16)
V −m (x) = max
m2∈Γ2(1)
min
m1∈Γ1(2)
W (x,m1,m2), (17)
respectively. To proceed, we present another static game
result obtained by von Neumann [9].
Lemma 3.5: Let M1 and M2 be finite sets. Let φ(·, ·) be
a function on M1 ×M2, µ1 ∈ P(M1) and µ2 ∈ P(M2) be
probability measure on M1 and M2, then
min
µ1∈P(M1)
max
µ2∈P(M2)
φ(µ1, µ2) =
max
µ2∈P(M2)
min
µ1∈P(M1)
φ(µ1, µ2).
(18)
Theorem 3.6: {ξn, n < ∞} is a Markov chain as in
Lemma 2.2 with relaxed control used. Assume p(x, y|·, ·)
and c(x, ·, ·) are continuous on U1 × U2. Let V +m (x) and
V −m (x) be associated upper and lower values of (16) and
(17). Then there always exists a saddle point, that is
V +m (x) = V
−
m (x), ∀x ∈ S.
Proof. Define two functions φ+m(·) and φ−m(·) by
φ+m(x, µ1, µ2) =
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|µ1, µ2)V
+
m (y) + c(x, µ1, µ2),
φ−m(x, µ1, µ2) =
∑
y∈S
p(x, y|µ1, µ2)V
−
m (y) + c(x, µ1, µ2).
Then dynamic programming equation in relaxed control
space can be written by
V +m (x) = min
µ1∈P(U1)
max
µ2∈P(U2)
{φ+m(x, µ1, µ2)},
V −m (x) = max
µ2∈P(U2)
min
µ1∈P(U1)
{φ−m(x, µ1, µ2)},
Note that c(x, ·, ·) is continuous in compact set U1 × U2.
Hence for ∀ε > 0, there exists a finite subset Uε1 × Uε2 ⊂
U1 × U2, such that∣∣∣ min
µ1∈P(U1)
max
µ2∈P(U2)
c(x, µ1, µ2)
− min
µε
1
∈P(Uε
1
)
max
µε
2
∈P(Uε
2
)
c(x, µε1, µ
ε
2)
∣∣∣ < ε. (19)
∣∣∣ max
µ2∈P(U2)
min
µ1∈P(U1)
c(x, µ1, µ2)
− max
µε
2
∈P(Uε
2
)
min
µε
1
∈P(Uε
1
)
c(x, µε1, µ
ε
2)
∣∣∣ < ε. (20)
Forcing to the limit as ε→ 0 in (19) and (20), as well as
using Lemma 3.5, we have
min
µ1∈P(U1)
max
µ2∈P(U2)
c(x, µ1, µ2) =
max
µ2∈P(U2)
min
µ1∈P(U1)
c(x, µ1, µ2).
(21)
Similarly, we obtain equality for function p(x, y|·, ·),
min
µ1∈P(U1)
max
µ2∈P(U2)
p(x, y|µ1, µ2) =
max
µ2∈P(U2)
min
µ1∈P(U1)
p(x, y|µ1, µ2).
(22)
Equalities in (21) and (22) implies
min
µ1∈P(U1)
max
µ2∈P(U2)
φ+m(x, µ1, µ2) =
max
µ2∈P(U2)
min
µ1∈P(U1)
φ+m(x, µ1, µ2).
(23)
The rest of this proof is similar to the lines of inequalities
(15). The details are omitted. 
IV. NUMERICAL METHODS REGIME-SWITCHING
STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
In this section, we formulate stochastic differential games
with regime switching. Numerical methods using Markov
chain approximation leads to a sequence of discrete Markov
games discussed in the previous section. The use of Theo-
rem 3.3 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of saddle
points, and facilitates the proof.
A. Formulation
Consider a two-player stochastic game of regime-
switching diffusions. For a finite set M = {1, . . . ,m0},
x ∈ Rl0 , b(·, ·, ·) : Rl0 × M × R × R 7→ Rl0 , σ(·, ·, ·) :
R
l0 ×M 7→ Rl0 × Rl0 , the dynamic system is given by
x(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
b(x(s), α(s), u1(s), u2(s))ds
+
∫ t
0
σ(x(s), α(s))dw(s),
(24)
where for each i = 1, 2, ui(·) is a control for player i,
w(·) is a standard Rl0 -valued Brownian motion, and α(·)
is a continuous-time Markov chain having state space M
with generator Q = (qι,ℓ) ∈ Rm0×m0 . Let {Ft : 0 ≤ t}
be a filtration, which might depend on controls, and which
measures at least {(w(s), α(s)) : s ≤ t}. We suppose that for
each i = 1, 2, ui(·) is Ft-adapted taking values in a compact
subset Ui ⊂ R, which are called admissible controls. Denote
A(x, ι) = σ(x, ι)σ′(x, ι) = (aj0k0(x, ι)) ∈ R
l0 ×Rl0 , which
is symmetric and positive definite.
Let G ⊂ Rl0 be a compact set that is the closure of its
interior G0 and τ be the first exit time of x(t) from Go with
τ = min{t : x(t) /∈ Go}. (25)
Using a real number β > 0 to denote the discount factor, let
the cost function be
W (x, ι, u) = Eux,ι
[ ∫ τ
0
e−βsk˜(x(s), α(s), u(s))ds
+g˜(x(τ), α(τ))
]
,
(26)
where k˜(·) and g˜(·) are functions representing the running
cost and terminal cost, respectively, and Eux,ι denotes the
expectation taken with the initial data x(0) = x and α(0) = ι
and given control process u(·) = (u1(·), u2(·)). Next, we
introduce the relaxed control representation; see [6], [7].
Definition 4.1: Let B(U × [0,∞)) be the σ-algebra of
Borel subsets of U × [0,∞). An admissible relaxed control
m(·) is a measure on B(U×[0,∞)) such that m(U×[0, t]) =
t for each t ≥ 0. Given a relaxed control m(·), there is an
mt(·) such that m(drdt) = mt(dr)dt. In fact, we can define
mt(B) = limδ→0
m(B × [t− δ, t])
δ
for B ∈ B(U).
To proceed, we need the following assumptions.
(A1) For each ι ∈M, k˜(·, ι, ·, ·) and b(·, ι, ·, ·) are continuous
functions on the compact set G× U1 × U2.
(A2) For each ι ∈ M, the functions σ(·, ι) and g˜(·, ι) are
continuous on G.
(A3) Equation (24), where the controls are replaced by
relaxed controls, has a unique weak sense solution
(i.e., unique in the sense of in distribution) for each
admissible triple (w(·), α(·),m(·)), where m(·) =
(m1(·),m2(·)).
(A4) For any ι ∈ M, j0, k0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l0}, j0 6= k0,
aj0j0(x, ι) >
∑
k0 6=j0
|aj0k0(x, ι)|.
(A5) Let τˆ (φ) =


∞, if φ(t) ∈ Go for all t <∞,
inf{t : φ(t) /∈ Go} otherwise.
The function τˆ(·) is continuous as a mapping from
D[0,∞) to [0,∞] with probability one relative to the
measure induced by any solution with initial condition
(x, ι), where D[0,∞) denotes the space of functions
that are right continuous and have left limits endowed
with the Skorohod topology, and [0,∞] is the interval
[0,∞) compactified (see [7, p. 259]).
(A6) The functions b(·) and k˜(·) are separable in r1 and r2
for every (x, ι) ∈ G × M. That is, b(x, ι, r1, r2) =∑2
i=1 b
i(x, ι, ri) and k˜(x, ι, r1, r2) =
∑2
i=1 k˜
i(x, ι, ri).
(A7) The cost k˜(·) is convex-concave with respect to (r1, r2),
and there exist Rl0 -valued continuous functions bi(x, ι)
(i = 0, 1, 2, 3) such that b(x, ι, r1, r2) = r1r2b0(x, ι) +
r1b
1(x, ι) + r2b
2(x, ι) + b3(x, ι).
Assumption (A4) is used for construction of transition
probabilities of the approximating Markov chain. It requires
that the diffusion matrix be diagonally dominated. If the
given dynamic system does not satisfy (A4), then we can
adjust the coordinate system to satisfy assumption (A4); see
[7, p. 110]. (A5) is a broad condition that is satisfied in
most applications. The main purpose is to avoid the tangency
problem discussed in [7, p. 278]. Later, we will establish
the existence of saddle points using either (A6) or (A7) in
addition to (A1)–(A5). Condition (A7) allows non-separable
differential games with respect to controls.
Now we are ready to define upper values, lower values,
and saddle points of differential games; see [6] for the cor-
responding definitions of systems without regime switching.
Let Ui be collection of all admissible ordinary control with
respect to (w(·), α(·))}. For ∆ > 0, Let Ui(∆) ⊂ Ui such
that ui(·) are piecewise constant on the intervals [k∆, k∆+
∆), k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and ui(k∆) is Fk∆-measurable.
Let Ł1(∆) ⊂ U1(∆) denote the set of such piecewise con-
stant controls for player 1 that are determined by measurable
real-valued functions Q1,n(·)
u1(n∆) = Q1,n(w(s), α(s), u(s), s < n∆), (27)
We can define Ł2(∆) and the associated rule u2 for player
2 analogous to (27).
Thus we can always suppose that if the control of
(for example) player 1 is determined by a form such as
(27). Then (in relaxed control terminology) the law of
(w(t), α(t),m2(t)) for n∆ ≤ t < (n + 1)∆ is determined
recursively by past information
{w(s), α(s),m2(s), s < t, ,m1(s), s ≤ n∆}. (28)
Definition 4.2: For initial condition x(0) = x, α(0) = ι,
define the upper and lower values for the game as
V +(x, ι) = lim
∆→0
inf
u1∈Ł1(∆)
sup
u2∈U2
W (x, ι, u1, u2), (29)
V −(x, ι) = lim
∆→0
sup
u2∈Ł2(∆)
inf
u1∈U1
W (x, ι, u1, u2). (30)
If the lower and upper value are equal, then we say there
exists a saddle point for the game, and its value is
V +(x, ι) = V −(x, ι) = V (x, ι), ∀x ∈ G, ι ∈M. (31)
B. Markov Chain Approximations
Here, we will construct a two-component Markov chain.
The discretization of differential game leads to a sequence
of discrete Markov games. The approximation is of finite
difference type. The basis of the approximation is a discrete-
time, finite-state, controlled Markov chain {(ξhn, αhn) : n <
∞} whose properties are locally consistent with that of (24).
For each h > 0, let Gh be a finite subset of G such that
d(Gh, G)→ 0 as h→ 0, where d(·) is a metric defined by
d(G,Gh) = max
p∈G
min
q∈Gh
d(p, q). (32)
Let {(ξhn, αhn) : n < ∞} be a controlled discrete-time
Markov chain on a discrete state space Gh × M with
transition probabilities denoted by ph((x, ι), (y, ℓ)|r), where
r = (r1, r2) ∈ U1 × U2. We use (uh1,n, uh2,n) to denote
the actual control action for the chain at discrete time n.
Suppose we have a positive function ∆th(·) on Gh ×M×
U1 × U2 such that supx,ι,r∆th(x, ι, r) → 0 as h → 0,
but infx,ι,r∆th(x, ι, r) > 0 for each h > 0. We take an
interpolation of the discrete Markov chain {(ξhn, αhn)} by
using interpolation interval ∆thn = ∆thn(ξhn , αhn, uh1,n, uh2,n).
Now we give the definition of local consistency.
Definition 4.3: Let {ph((x, ι), (y, ℓ)|r)} for (x, ι) and
(y, ℓ) in Gh × M and r ∈ U1 × U2 be a collec-
tion of well-defined transition probabilities for the two-
component Markov chain {(ξhn, αhn)}, approximation to
(x(·), α(·)). Define the difference ∆ξhn = ξhn+1−ξhn. Assume
limh→0 supx,ι,r∆t
h(x, ι, r) = 0. Denote by Er,hx,ι,n, covr,hx,ι,n
and pr,hx,ι,n the conditional expectation, covariance, and prob-
ability given {ξhk , αhk , uh1,k, uh2,k, k ≤ n, ξhn = x, αhn =
ι, (uh1,n, u
h
2,n) = r}. The sequence {(ξhn, αhn)} is said to be
locally consistent with (24), for ∆th = ∆th(x, ι, r), if
Er,hx,ι,n∆ξ
h
n = b(x, ι, r)∆t
h + o(∆th),
covr,hx,ι,n∆ξ
h
n = A(x, ι)∆t
h + o(∆th),
pr,hx,ι,n{α
h
n+1 = ℓ} = qιℓ∆t
h + o(∆th), for ℓ 6= ι,
pr,hx,ι,n{α
h
n+1 = ι} = (1 + qιι)∆t
h + o(∆th),
sup
n,ω∈Ω
|∆ξhn | → 0 as h→ 0,
(33)
To approximate the cost defined in (26), we define a cost
function using the Markov chain above. Let
thn =
n−1∑
j=0
∆thj and Nh = inf{n : ξhn /∈ Goh}.
The cost for uh = {(uh1,n, uh2,n)} and initial (x, ι) is
Wh(x, ι, uh) = Ex,ι
[Nh−1∑
n=0
e−βt
h
n∆thn·
k˜(ξhn, α
h
n, u
h
1,n, u
h
2,n) + g˜(ξ
h
Nh
, αhNh)
]
,
(34)
Using Uhi (1) to denote the space of the ordinary controls
that player i goes first, and its strategy is defined by mea-
surable functions of the type similar to (27). That is, for
uhi ∈ U
h
i (1), u
h
i,n is determined by
{ξhk , α
h
k , k ≤ n;u
h
1,k, u
h
2,k, k < n}.
By Uhi (2) denote the collection of the ordinary controls that
player i goes last. For uhi ∈ Uhi (2), uhi,n is determined by
{ξhk , α
h
k , k ≤ n;u
h
i,k, k < n;u
h
j,k, k ≤ n, j 6= i}.
The associated upper and lower values is defined as
V h,+(x, ι) = inf
uh
1
∈Uh
1
(1)
sup
uh
2
∈Uh
2
(2)
Wh(x, ι, uh1 , u
h
2), (35)
V h,−(x, ι) = sup
uh
2
∈Uh
2
(1)
inf
uh
1
∈Uh
1
(2)
Wh(x, ι, uh1 , u
h
2 ). (36)
C. Saddle Points for the Markov Chain Approximation
In this section, we present a local consistent discrete
Markov game of {(ξhn, αhn)} generated by central finite
difference scheme for analysis purpose. Under assumptions
(A1)–(A5) together with either (A6) or (A7), we can apply
Theorem 3.3 to show the existence of saddle points for
each h. By forcing the limit h → 0, the upper (lower)
values converge to that of stochastic differential game by
Lemma 4.6, and it results in the existence of saddle points.
First, the transition probabilities for {(ξhn, αhn)} are
ph((x, ι), (x ± ej0h, ι)|r) =
±hbj0(x, ι, r) + aj0j0(x, ι) −
∑
k0 6=j0
|aj0k0(x, ι)|
2(Dh(x, ι) − βh2)
,
for j0 = 1, 2, . . . , l0,
ph((x, ι), (x + ej0h+ ek0h, ι)|r) =
1/2 · a+j0k0(x, ι)
Dh(x, ι) − βh2
,
ph((x, ι), (x − ej0h− ek0h, ι)|r) =
1/2 · a+j0k0(x, ι)
Dh(x, ι) − βh2
,
for j0 < k0
ph((x, ι), (x + ej0h− ek0h, ι)|r) =
1/2 · a−j0k0(x, ι)
Dh(x, ι) − βh2
,
for j0 6= k0,
ph((x, ι), (x, ℓ)|r) =
qιℓh
2
Dh(x, ι) − βh2
, ℓ 6= ι,
ph((x, ι), (y, ℓ)|r) = 0, otherwise.
(37)
where
Dh(x, ι) =
l0∑
j0=1
aj0j0(x, ι)−
∑
j0<k0
|aj0k0(x, ι)|−qιιh
2+βh2,
Set the interpolation interval as ∆th(x, ι) = h2/Dh(x, ι).
By (A4), Dh(x, ι) − βh2 > 0. Also, we have∑
(y,ℓ) p
h((x, ι), (y, ℓ)|r) = 1. To ensure that ph(·) is always
nonnegative, we require
h ≤
minj0{aj0j0(x, ι)−
∑
k0 6=j0
|aj0k0(x, ι)|}
maxr |bj0(x, ι, r1, r2)|
. (38)
Lemma 4.4: Assume (A1), (A2), (A4), and h satisfies
(38). The Markov chain (ξhn, αhn) with transition probabilities
{ph(·)} and interpolation ∆th(·) defined above is locally
consistent with (24).
Proof. The criterion in (33) can be verified through a series
of calculations, thus details are omitted. 
Theorem 4.5: Assume (A1)–(A5), either (A6) or (A7),
and Gh is a finite set defined above (32). For x ∈ Gh and
ι ∈ M, a Markov chain is defined by (37) . Let V h,+(x, ι)
and V h,−(x, ι) be the associated upper and lower values
defined in (35) and (36) in the control spaces Uhi (1) and
Uhj (2) . Then there exists a saddle point
V h,+(x, ι) = V h,−(x, ι), (39)
provided h satisfies (38).
Proof. The contraction condition (9) satisfies for the discount
factor β > 0. Let
p((x, ι)(y, ℓ)|r1, r2) = p
h(((x, ι)(y, ℓ)|r1, r2),
c(x, ι, r1, r2) = e
−β∆th(x,ι)∆th(x, ι)k˜(x, ι, r1, r2).
Assumptions (A6) and (A7) lead to (H1) and (H2), respec-
tively. The result holds applying Theorem 3.3. 
Although the proof of next lemma is rather complicated
and not trivial, the proof is referred to weak convergence
techniques in [7], [5], and [6] due to the limit of space.
Lemma 4.6: Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.5
are satisfied. Then for the approximating Markov chain, we
have
lim
h→0
V h,+(x, ι) = V +(x, ι), (40)
lim
h→0
V h,−(x, ι) = V −(x, ι). (41)
Theorem 4.7: Assume the conditions of Theorem 4.5 are
satisfied. Then the differential game has saddle point in the
sense
V +(x, ι) = V −(x, ι). (42)
V. FURTHER REMARKS
The key part of zero-sum game problems is existence of
saddle point. This paper is devoted to sufficient condition
for the existence of saddle point in discrete Markov game.
Using dynamic programming equation method, we are able
to use static game results of Sion [13] and von Neumann [9]
to discover the sufficient conditions. A direct application is
numerical methods for stochastic differential game problems.
The transition probabilities used in (37) requires restriction
(38) on h. Practically, we develop the transition probabilities
by upward finite difference scheme, so that the generated
one is well defined without restriction on h. It can be
routinely calculated to verify the local consistency. This kind
of discrete Markov game might have different upper and
lower values for some h. However, both the upper and lower
values in this situation converge to the original saddle point
of differential game V (x) by Lemma 4.6 and Theorem 4.7.
Numerical examples in pursuit-evasion games are omitted
due to the space limit, although the numerical results clearly
verify our works.
For a regime-switching system in which the Markov chain
has a large state space, we may use the ideas of two-time-
scale approach presented in [16] (see also [17] and references
therein) to first reduce the complexity of the underlying
system and then construct numerical solutions for the limit
systems. Optimal strategies of the limit systems can be used
for constructing strategies of the original systems leading to
near optimality.
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